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Earnings Overseas and Cash Holdings 
 
Abstract 
I investigate the impact of foreign pre-tax income on the total amount of cash held by 
companies and on the amount of cash that is held in companies’ foreign subsidiaries. I 
also investigate the impact of the existence and amount of cash held on companies’ 
foreign subsidiaries in the composition of cash holdings in terms of risk and liquidity. 
Using a sample of 100 largest U.S. non-financial and non-utilities companies I find that 
companies with higher earnings overseas present higher cash reserves and invest a 
higher fraction of their cash in risky assets. My evidence suggests that companies have a 
different optimization strategy for cash overseas, in which precautionary motives are not 
the main driver for holding cash. 
 





The amount of cash holdings held by U.S. publicly traded companies has been 
increasing during the last decades and currently accounts for more than 20% of their 
assets (Foley et al. (2007) and Bates et al. (2009)). Academic research work has shown 
that the decision of a company’s amount of cash holdings is based on the tradeoff 
between the costs and benefits that holding this cash brings. For instances, the choice of 
cash holdings amount are normally assumed to be related to precautionary savings 
motive (Keynes (1936), Baumol (1956), Miller and Orr (1968), Kim et al. (1998) and 
Almeida et al. (2013)) since cash holdings enable companies to secure financing in case 
the company does not have enough funds to comply with its obligations and/or invest in 
profitable projects as a result of external finance frictions. Empirically, academics have 
had significant achievement explaining cash holdings through studying the variation in 
company attributes linked to precautionary demand. Some examples are growth 
opportunities, information asymmetry, and cash flow volatility (e.g., Opler et al. (1999) 
and Harford (1999)).  
On the other hand, large amounts of cash reserves can bring costs, for example, 
large amount of holdings, mainly in poorly governed companies, can drive managers to 
invest in self-interesting and value destroying projects (e.g., Jensen (1986), Harford 
(1999), Harford, et al. (2008), and Cunha (2013)).  
Most of the studies mentioned above had as an assumption that cash holdings are 
kept in cash, or close to risk-free, highly liquid near-cash securities, since those cash 
holdings were considered to be hold for precautionary motives. With the 
implementation of the 2009 new accounting rule SEFAS nº157 it was possible to see 
that the type of securities hold by U.S. companies are much broader and are not 
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necessarily liquid and/or close to risk-free (e.g., Brown (2014), and Duchin et al. 
(2014)). With SEFAS nº 157, which oblige companies to report the fair value and 
composition of their financial assets, is now possible to study the variation in the types 
of securities that comprise cash holdings and the factors that explain this variation. This 
is important, because different types of financial instruments carry different levels of 
risk and liquidity. Having financial instruments that are risky and illiquid shows that 
there may be other reasons to explain the variation in the amount of cash holdings 
between companies.  
One possible explanation for firms to be holding their cash in risky assets is that 
this cash might be “trapped” overseas. The United States has one of the highest 
corporate income tax rate with a 35% statutory federal tax rate. Previous evidence has 
shown that one significant reason for the increase in corporate liquidity in U.S 
companies in the past years is the differential between the tax jurisdictions of U.S. 
foreign subsidiaries and the U.S. (Foley, et al. (2007)). The fact that the tax liability just 
arises when foreign earnings are repatriated instead of arising in the year in which they 
were reported creates an incentive to postpone the repatriation of those earnings in order 
to postpone the tax payments. By not repatriating those earnings, the amounts of cash 
held by these foreign subsidiaries increase (in case they were not needed to fund 
investments and/or operations in the foreign subsidiaries), and consequentially, the 
amount of cash held by the company as a whole also increases. 
To demonstrate this lets see a simplified example. Assume Apple had 1.000.000 
US$ profit before income taxes in Portugal in 2014. The corporate income tax faced by 
Apple in Portugal is currently 23% and in the United States is 35%. If those earnings 
were repatriated in the current year – 2014 – Apple would deliver to the Portuguese tax 
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jurisdictions 230.000 US$, and to the U.S. tax jurisdictions 120.000 US$ (35% - 23% 
multiplied by the Portuguese profit before income taxes). If those earnings were not 
repatriated to the U.S, the company could postpone the payment of 120.000 US$ and 
invest them in financial instruments (e.g. U.S. Treasuries, Corporate Bonds, Equities, 
etc...) that provide return. This return can be seen as “free money” that a company 
receives by postponing the repatriation. For this reason it is expected a positive relation 
between profit before income taxes from foreign operations and cash held at foreign 
subsidiaries, and a positive relation between profit before income taxes from foreign 
operation and the total amount of cash holdings. 
Since the cash that is held by foreign subsidiaries when repatriated needs to pay 
taxes, the foreign cash reserves are available for general corporate purposes only at a 
discount to its face value. This leads to two potential reasons for companies to invest in 
illiquid and/or risky securities (Duchin et al. (2014). The first argument is that if these 
holdings are currently illiquid (cannot be used without a discount), then the opportunity 
cost (potential damages when the company needs the cash and do not have it) of 
investing cash holdings in illiquid or risky securities is small. The second possible 
argument is that if the company cannot (at no cost) distribute foreign cash holdings to 
stockholders, the company should invest reserves as they would wish to invest it. By 
investing in different type of securities higher yields can be achieved with lower risk 
(through diversification). Therefore, cash trapped overseas is not subject to the same 
optimization problem as cash held in the U.S. Accordingly, I expect a positive relation 
between cash held at foreign subsidiaries and the riskiness present on cash holdings, and 
also a positive relation between profit before income taxes from foreign operation and 
the riskiness present on cash holdings. 
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In my sample, I found a significant positive relation between profit before 
income taxes from foreign operation and the total amount of cash holdings. I also found 
a significant positive relation between cash held at foreign subsidiaries and the riskiness 
present on cash holdings, and a significant positive relation between profit before 
income taxes from foreign operation and the riskiness present on cash holdings. My 
results are consistent with the theory that companies with higher earnings overseas 
present higher cash reserves and invest a higher fraction of their cash in risky assets 
suggesting that companies have a different optimization strategy for cash overseas, in 
which precautionary motives are not the main driver for holding cash. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a 
literature review. Section 3 describes the collection, classification and summary 
statistics of the data that was used. Section 4 discusses my findings. Finally, Section 6 
provides a conclusion. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Precautionary savings motive to hold cash means that companies hold cash with 
the aim of safeguarding financing when the company may not have enough funds to 
invest and/or comply with its obligations as a result of external finance frictions. 
Preceding academic research has been using this reasoning to properly understand 
corporate cash policy (Keynes (1936), Baumol (1952), Miller and Orr (1966), Kim et al. 
(1998) and Almeida et al. (2013)). Actually, this justification is used, not just by 
academics, but also by practitioners. Precautionary savings motive is the most common 
justification for holding cash given by managers (Lins et al. (2010) and Campello et al. 
(2011)). Empirically, company characteristics related to precautionary demand, such as 
growth opportunities, cash flow volatility, and information asymmetry, have been 
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having significant success explaining cash holdings (e.g., Opler et al. (1999) and 
Harford (1999)). Recently, precautionary savings motive has been proven to be 
important to explain the rise in average cash holdings (e.g., Bates et al. (2009) and 
Duchin (2010)), and the precautionary savings were proven to be important to mitigate 
the impact of the 2008 financial crisis (e.g., Campello et al. (2010) and Duchin et al. 
(2010)). 
An important supposition used by researchers in these studies was that cash 
holdings were invested in cash or highly liquid, risk-free near-cash securities. Otherwise 
they would not properly form precautionary savings. Recent studies however, 
discovered that this is not exactly what is happening. Duchin et al. (2014) found that the 
types of securities that constitute companies’ cash holdings vary widely and contain 
foreign government debt, foreign and domestic corporate debt, mortgage and asset 
backed securities, equity investments, and several other assets. These financial assets 
are undoubtedly exposed to liquidity and covariance risk and are, for that reason, not 
risk-free, cash or near-cash securities. They discovered that a substantial part of cash 
holdings is held in these types of risky and potentially illiquid securities. The average 
company in their sample held 26.8% of corporate cash holdings in risky securities. On a 
value-weighted basis, this average was equal to 48.7%. Generally, relative to its total 
book (market) value, the average company held 5.6% (4.7%) of its value in potentially 
illiquid and risky securities. 
If the only reason to hold cash holdings was for precaution, it could be said that 
managers and CFOs were doing a poor job. It would not make sense to invest in 
securities that positively co-vary with the company’s cash flows and become illiquid in 
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crises if those securities were holding in the first place for precaution. Hence, other 
reasons may exist in choosing the cash holdings’ amount and riskiness.  
One possible hypothesis is that this could be merely an indication of the 
straightforward agency problem between stockholders and managers. This hypothesis is 
consistent with Jensen’s (1986) argument that large free cash flows (more cash than 
profitable investment opportunities) lead managers to an inefficient behavior such as 
wasting resources in bad projects if managers have private benefits of control. Harford 
(1999), Harford, et al. (2008) Cunha (2013) provide empirical support for this claim.  
 In this hypothesis, the agency problem may appear because treasury employees 
choose to invest in a more broad type of securities, to make their work more exciting 
and/or to develop human capital that can be valuable somewhere else in the asset 
management sector (Holmstrom (1999)). 
Other hypothesis, the one that is being studied, is related with U.S. taxation 
system. Prior studies have shown that a significant part of the increase in U.S 
companies’ cash holdings in the last couple decades are caused by the tax differential 
between the tax jurisdictions of U.S. foreign affiliates and the U.S. (Foley, et al. 
(2007)). As Faulkender and Petersen (2012) explain, taxes are the same whether they 
are kept in foreign subsidiaries or repatriated immediately to U.S. Nevertheless, since 
the US tax liability emerges not when earnings are earned but after they are repatriated, 
companies obtain a significant benefit by leaving the earnings in the foreign subsidiary. 
Foley, et al. (2007) found that companies that face higher repatriation tax burdens hold 
higher amounts of cash and hold this cash in non-U.S subsidiaries. 
The fact that foreign reserves in order to be repatriated, and thus be used for the 
general corporate purposes, need to pay taxes creates a liquidity friction that promotes 
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the investment in non-risky and illiquid securities. Firstly, if holdings are already 
illiquid (can be converted to available cash only at discount to its value), then the 
opportunity cost - potential losses when the company needs the funds - of investing 
them in illiquid or risky financial assets is small (Duchin et al. (2014)). Additionally, 
from the company’s viewpoint, it would be ideal to invest in illiquid securities and grab 
an illiquidity premium since the holdings are previously illiquid. A second possible 
argument is that if cash holdings cannot, at no cost, be given to stockholders, the 
company should invest them as investors would wish to invest them (Duchin et al. 
(2014)). By investing in different type of securities higher yields can be achieved with 
lower risk (through diversification) benefiting investors. 
 
3. Data 
3.1. The composition of cash holdings 
 The majority of previous studies on corporate cash holdings define a company’s 
total cash holdings as the sum of its cash, and cash equivalents (Compustat variable 
“CH”) and its short-term investments/marketable securities (Compustat variable 
“IVST”), which represent the Compustat variable “CHE”. The problem with using only 
this variable to define the total amount of cash holdings is that companies may report 
additional security holdings elsewhere in the balance sheet, for example in long-term 
investments/marketable securities. One illustration of this problem appears in Apple. 
For example, in 2013, the company stated that had Cash and Equivalents totaling 
14,259 million US$, Short-term Marketable Securities totaling 26,287 million US$, and 
long-term marketable securities totaling 106.215 million US$. In the long-term 
marketable securities were present risky securities such as Mortgage- and Asset-backed 
securities. By assuming the Compustat variable “CHE” as the total amount of cash 
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holdings, I was undervaluing the true value of the total amount of cash holding, and 
would also being underestimating the risk present on it. 
The Compustat variable “IVAO” (Investments and Advances – Other) includes 
these long-term investments/marketable securities, but it can also include other items 
that are not cash holdings such as long-term receivables (is the case of for example 
Automatic Data Processing), investments in non-publicly traded companies held for 
strategic reasons (is the case of for example Salesforce.Com Inc), between others. Since 
my goal is to measure the company’s amount of cash holdings invested in risky and 
non-risky securities I cannot rely on Compustat data and must hand collect this 
information from the footnotes that provide a detailed breakdown on the company’s 
investment securities. For that reason, the total amount of cash holdings is equal to the 
sum of the Compustat variable “CHE” and my own Investments and Advances variable. 
This variable represents the Compustat variable “IVAO” less all the items that are not 
considered cash holdings: Equity/Cost method Investments (in which the company has 
significant influence and/or has for strategic reasons), long-term receivables, long-term 
financial leases, etc.. 
 
3.2. Data collection and asset classification methodology 
In order to accomplish this work I hand collected data related to which types of 
financial instruments and amounts that constitutes cash holdings for each company for 
each year. Primarily driven by the implementation of SFAS 157, most companies report 
in their annual report a foot note labeled “fair value 
measurements/investments/estimates”. This footnote typically includes the value of the 
company’s financial holdings broken by asset class which enabled me to collect some of 
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the data that I needed.  In some cases this information was present in footnotes such as 
Investments, Marketable securities, etc. Finally, some missing information was found in 
the middle of several parts of the report such as Liquidity and Capital Resources, 
Accounting policies, etc.. 
The cash holdings were broke down between: Money Market Mutual Funds, 
Mutual Funds, US Treasury, US Agency, Non-US Agency, Non-US Treasury, 
Certificate/Time deposits, Commercial Paper, Corporate Debt Securities, Corporate 
Equity Securities, Municipal Securities, Auction Rate securities, Mortgage- and asset-
backed securities, Other non-specified, Other Risky, Other Non-Risky, Cash, Cash and 
equivalents not allocated. The amounts allocated to “Other non-specified” were the 
amounts that were not Cash and equivalents, and the company did not specified in 
which type of securities the amount was invested (e.g. “other investments”). The 
amounts allocated to “Other risky” were amounts that in the report was stated in which 
types of securities were invested, and all the type of securities were considered risky but 
it was not provided the amount for each type of security. Also, other security types 
different than the mentioned above that were risky were allocated to this variable (e.g. 
REITS). The same reasoning was applied to “Other Non-Risky”. Cash and equivalents 
not allocated were the amount of the Cash and equivalents (“CH”) that were not broken 
down into security types. 
To define the total amount of Risky and Non-Risky cash holdings I follow 
Duchin et al. (2014). “Money Market Mutual Funds”, “US Treasury”, “Certificate/Time 
Deposits”, “Commercial Paper”, “Other Non-Risky”, “Cash”, “Cash and equivalents 




The amount of cash held by foreign subsidiaries was also hand collected. 
Normally this information was present in the annual report footnote “Liquidity and 
Capital Resources” or “Financial Condition”. Sometimes it appeared in the “Income 
Taxes” footnote. It’s important to say that sometimes the companies do not provide this 
information, but they state if they have or not cash held at foreign subsidiaries. For that 
reason, it was created a dummy variable that in case the company holds foreign cash it 
is equal to 1, otherwise it is equal to 0. 
I also needed the pre-tax income from foreign operations that was taken from the 
Compustat database. Similarly, other control variables were taken from the Compustat 
database. 
 
3.3. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
My sample includes the 100 largest U.S. companies in 2013 that are not 
financial or utility companies. The sample period is between 2008 and 2013. 2008 is the 
year before SFAS 157 became effective and is the year that the required data to perform 
the analysis starts to be reported. 2013 is the most recent year for which complete 
annual reports data exists. Since some companies just had their IPO after 2008, the 
sample period of these companies can be different. In total there were 582 company-
year observations. 
In the studied sample, 78% of the companies have risky and potential illiquid 
securities constituting their cash holdings and 72% have cash held at foreign 
subsidiaries. Table 1 reports summary statistics of the composition of cash holdings 
during the sample period. 
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 Panel A of Table 1 shows that on average cash holdings account for 17.52% of 
an average company’s assets. It also shows that, on average, 16.93% of cash holdings 
are invested in risky and potential illiquid securities. The amount invested in these 
securities account 5.24% of an average company’s assets.  
When considering just companies that have cash held at foreign subsidiaries, 
these percentages are appear to be higher than when considering full sample. Looking to 
Panel C of Table 1 it is possible to see that, on average, cash holdings account for 
21.43% of these companies’ assets. Furthermore, on average 23.52% of these holdings 
are invested in risky and potential illiquid securities. The amount invested in these 
securities account, on average, 7.27% of company’s assets. 
These results are consistent with what was expected. It’s possible to see that, on 
average, companies that held cash at foreign subsidiaries held higher amounts of cash 
holdings (controlled for total Assets). Additionally, on average the riskiness present on 
their cash holdings is also higher (controlled for total assets and for total cash holdings). 
  
4. Tests Results 
In this section I investigate if the sample shows a significant positive relation 
between profit before income taxes from foreign operations (normalized by assets) and 
cash held at foreign subsidiaries (normalized both by assets and total cash), and a 
significant positive relation between profit before income taxes from foreign operations 
(normalized by assets) and the total amount of cash holdings (normalized by assets).  
In addition, it is also tested if it is present a significant positive relation between 
cash held at foreign subsidiaries (normalized both by assets and total cash holdings) and 
the amount of cash holdings that is invested in risky and potential illiquid securities 
(normalized both by assets and total cash holdings), and also a significant positive 
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relation between profit before income taxes from foreign operations (normalized by 
assets) and the riskiness present on it (normalized both by assets and total cash). 
 To accomplish these investigations I have employed OLS regressions using 
robust standard errors and include also as independent variables control variables 
widely used in precautionary savings models. These variables are: Size, Leverage, 
Market-to-book Ratio, Sales Growth, Capex, Price-to-Earnings Rato, Cash Flow, Return on 
Assets and Cash growth. In Table 2 is described how these variables were constructed. 
Additionally, all models were regressed with and without controlling for fixed year effects. 
 
4.1. Effect of Foreign Profit in Cash Held at Foreign Subsidiaries and in Total Cash 
 In Table 3 columns 1 to 4, I regress cash held at foreign subsidiaries (normalized 
by total assets - columns 1 and 2 - and normalized by total cash – columns 3 and 4) on 
pre-tax foreign profit (normalized by total assets). Both regressions show a significant 
positive relation between the dependent variable and the independent variable 
controlling and not controlling for fixed year effects. The same results appear when 
regressing total cash (normalized by total assets) on foreign profit (normalized by total 
assets) as columns 5 and 6 show. These results are economically meaningful. 
Specifically, when controlling for fixed year effects, the increase in one percentage 
point in Foreign Profit/Assets will lead to an increase of 0.65 percentage points in 
Foreign Cash/Assets, to an increase of 1.885 percentage points in Foreign Cash/Total 
Cash, and to an increase of 0.373 percentage points in Total Cash/Assets. 
 These results suggest that when foreign pre-tax profit increases, cash held at 
foreign subsidiaries increase - due to the non-repatriation of earnings - and, as 




4.2. Effect of Foreign Cash in Cash Holdings Risk 
In Table 4 Panel A, I regress the amount of cash held in risky securities 
(normalized by total assets - columns 1 and 2 - and normalized by total cash – columns 
3 and 4) on a dummy variable that is equal to 0 when the company does not held cash at 
foreign subsidiaries, and equals to 1 otherwise. Both regressions show a significant 
positive relation between the dependent variable and the independent variable 
controlling and not controlling for fixed year effects. The same results appear when 
using the amount of cash held at foreign subsidiaries (normalized by total assets – Table 
3 Panel B) as the independent variable. Similarly, when regressing the amount of Cash 
held in risky securities (normalized by total cash – Panel C columns 3 and 4) on the 
amount of cash held at foreign subsidiaries (normalized by total cash) the relation also 
appears to be positive and significant controlling and not controlling for fixed year 
effects. These results are economically meaningful. Specifically, when controlling for 
fixed year effects, a company that has cash “trapped” abroad has 3.4 percentages points 
more Risky Cash/Assets and 8.4 percentages points more Risky Cash/Cash. 
Additionally, the increase in one percentage point in Foreign Cash/Assets will lead to an 
increase of 0.606 percentage points in Risky Cash/Assets, and to an increase of 1.128 
percentage points in Risky Cash/Total Cash. Finally, the increase in one percentage 
point in Foreign Cash/Total Cash will lead to an increase of 0.034 percentage points in 
Risky Cash/Assets, and to an increase of 0.172 percentage points in Risky Cash/Total 
Cash. 
These results suggest that when cash holdings held in foreign subsidiaries 
increase, the company tends to invest more in securities that comprise more risk and are 
potentially more illiquid. Those results are consistent with the theory that the company 
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has incentives to invest in these types of securities due to a liquidity friction that came 
from the fact that foreign reserves in order to be repatriated, and thus be used for the 
general corporate purposes, need to pay taxes. 
 
4.3. Effect of Foreign Profit in Cash Holdings Risk 
 In Table 5, I regress the amount of cash held in risky securities 
(normalized by total assets - columns 1 and 2 - and normalized by total cash – columns 
3 and 4) on pre-tax foreign profit (normalized by total assets). Both regressions show a 
significant positive relation between the dependent variable and the independent 
variable when not controlling for fixed year effects. The same results appear if 
controlling for fixed year effects only when the dependent variable is normalized by 
total assets. These results are economically meaningful. Specifically, when controlling 
for fixed year effects, the increase in one percentage point in Foreign Profit/Assets will 
lead to an increase of 0.215 percentage points in Risky Cash/Assets, and to an increase 
of 0.365 percentage points in Risky Cash/Cash. 
These results, putting together with the results of Table 3 and 4, suggest that 
when a company obtain profits in its foreign operations, by leaving part of these 
earnings in foreign subsidiary’ cash holding, it will increase cash held at foreign 
subsidiaries. As consequence the company tends to invest more in securities that 





Although the most common assumed reason for holding cash is for precaution, 
the reality is that companies are investing their cash in risky and potentially illiquid 
securities. This is demonstrated by my estimates: 16.93% of an average company’s cash 
holdings are invested in risky and potential illiquid securities. Accordingly, other 
reasons may exits to hold cash. 
One possible reason, the one that was studied, is the fact that the tax liability just 
arises when foreign earnings are repatriated instead of arising in the year in which they 
were reported. This difference in tax treatment creates an incentive to postpone the 
repatriation of those earnings in order to postpone the tax payments. By not repatriating 
those earnings, the amounts of cash held by these foreign subsidiaries and by the 
company as a whole increase. My results support this reasoning since I found that both 
cash held at foreign subsidiaries and total cash increase with pre-tax foreign income. 
I also found that the amount of cash held in risky securities increases with both 
cash held at foreign subsidiaries and pre-tax foreign income. Those results are 
consistent with the theory that it might be optimal for the company to invest in these 
types of securities since the cash that is held by foreign subsidiaries is only available for 
general corporate purposes at a discount. It might be optimal because the opportunity 
cost of investing reserves in illiquid or risky securities is smaller since foreign cash is 
already illiquid. Additionally if the company cannot distribute foreign cash holdings to 
stockholders, it should invest reserves as they would wish to invest it. By investing in 
different types of securities, higher yields can be achieved with lower risk (through 
diversification), benefiting investors. Therefore, cash trapped overseas is not subject to 
the same optimization problem as cash held in the U.S.  
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In summary I found that companies with higher earnings overseas present higher 
cash reserves and invest a higher fraction of their cash in risky assets suggesting that 
companies have a different optimization strategy for cash overseas, in which 
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics 





















Mean 8480 2796 5683 17,52% 16,93% 5,24% 
St Dev 13693 8232 7368 17,37% 21,39% 9,93% 
Max 146761 103302 68461 79,00% 86,20% 52,41% 
Min 20 0 20 0,06% 0,00% 0,00% 
Median 3676 241 3193 10,64% 4,99% 0,45% 
1
st
 Quartile 1878 0 1621 5,35% 0,00% 0,00% 
3
rd
 Quartile 8972 1469 7018 24,41% 30,30% 5,19% 






















Mean 10912 3883 7028 21,43% 23,52% 7,27% 
St Dev 15433 9485 8231 18,56% 21,92% 11,06% 
Max 146761 103302 68461 79,00% 86,20% 52,41% 
Min 226 3 216 0,65% 0,23% 0,01% 
Median 5245 642 4209 15,47% 16,41% 1,67% 
1
st
 Quartile 2801 163 2131 7,18% 3,88% 0,35% 
3
rd
 Quartile 12013 2439 8953 30,50% 39,01% 10,62% 






















Mean 9539 3348 6204 19,69% 18,97% 6,14% 
St Dev 15014 9157 7932 17,24% 21,58% 10,31% 
Max 146761 103302 68461 79,00% 86,20% 52,41% 
Min 32 0 32 0,25% 0,00% 0,00% 
Median 4008 359 3452 13,60% 10,50% 0,89% 
1
st
 Quartile 2088 22 1840 6,86% 0,91% 0,09% 
3
rd




Table 2 – Variables Construction Details 
Variable Contruction using Compustat Variables 
  
Capex capx / ppent 
Cash Flow (ib + dp) / at 
Cash growth (Total Casht  – Total Casht-1) / Total Casht-1 
Foreign Profit pifo / at 
Leverage (dlc – dltt) / (prcc f * csho) 
Market-to-book Ratio (prcc f * csho) / (at – lt - mib 
Price-to-Earnings Ratio prcc f / epspi 
Return on Assets ib / at 
Sales Growth (salet – salet-1) / salet-1 




Table 3 – Effect of Foreign Pre-tax income in Cash Held at Foreign Subsidiaries 
and in Total Cash 
Table 3 presents the results from OLS regressions where the dependent variables are cash held at foreign subsidiaries 
divided by total assets (columns 1-2), cash held at foreign subsidiaries divided by total cash (columns 3-4), and total 
cash divided by total assets is (columns 5-6), and the independent variables are profit before income taxes from their 
foreign operations divided by total assets and control variables. The sample comprises the 100 largest U.S. companies 
in 2013 that are not financial or utility companies from 2008-2013 with available information in their annual reports 
(10-K) on the fair value of their financial assets holdings, as well as available data on Compustat dataset for profit 
before income taxes from their foreign operations and for control variables. All control variable construction details 
are given in Table 2. Some regressions include year fixed effects which are not shown. The standard errors (in 








 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Foreign Profit 0.673*** 0.650** 2.040*** 1.885*** 0.353** 0.373** 
 (0.243) (0.258) (0.677) (0.687) (0.160) (0.164) 
Size 0.124*** 0.126*** 0.180*** 0.191*** -0.0227 -0.0218 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.051) (0.054) (0.020) (0.019) 
Leverage -0.097 -0.088 0.234 0.254 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.347) (0.351) (0.002) (0.002) 
Market-to-book 
Ratio 
0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) 
Sales Growth -0.031 -0.031 -0.048 -0.009 0.043 0.081* 
 (0.063) (0.074) (0.143) (0.158) (0.039) (0.048) 
Capex 0.442*** 0.448*** 0.013 0.016 0.766*** 0.747*** 
 (0.084) (0.085) (0.206) (0.206) (0.087) (0.087) 
Price-to-
Earnings Ratio 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 





 (0.531) (0.551) (1.197) (1.233) (0.332) (0.327) 
Return on 
Assets 
2.331*** 2.319*** -1.075 -0.833 2.382*** 2.314*** 
 (0.610) (0.630) (1.320) (1.353) (0.348) (0.348) 
Cash growth -0.003 -0.008 -0.044 -0.055 0.007 0.006 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.043) (0.046) (0.005) (0.005) 
       
Constant -0.486*** -0.482*** -0.383 -0.386 0.183* 0.200** 
 (0.123) (0.130) (0.267) (0.283) (0.101) (0.098) 




No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 124 124 124 124 349 349 





Table 4 – Effect of Foreign Cash in Cash Holdings Risk 
Panel A: Dependent variable – Dummy variable (1- Cash held in foreign subsidiaries, 0 – 
No cash held in foreign subsidiaries 
Table 4 Panel A presents the results from OLS regressions where the dependent variables are the amount of cash 
invested in risky and potentially illiquid securities divided by total assets (columns 1-2), and the amount of cash 
invested in risky and potentially illiquid securities divided by total cash (columns 3-4), and the independent variables 
are a dummy variable that is equal to 0 when the company do not held cash at foreign subsidiaries and equal to 1 
otherwise, and control variables. The sample comprises the 100 largest U.S. companies in 2013 that are not financial 
or utility companies from 2008-2013 with available information in their annual reports (10-K) on the fair value of 
their financial assets holdings, as well as available data on Compustat dataset for control variables. All control 
variable construction details are given in Table 2. Some regressions include year fixed effects which are not shown. 
The standard errors (in brackets) are heteroskedasticity consistent. Significance levels are indicated as follows: * = 
10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
 
 Risky Cash/Assets Risky Cash/Cash 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Foreign Cash (Dummy) 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.024) (0.024) 
Size 0.021* 0.024* 0.087*** 0.097*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.029) (0.029) 
Leverage -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Market-to-book Ratio 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales Growth 0.043* 0.076*** 0.069 0.119* 
 (0.023) (0.028) (0.055) (0.064) 
Capex 0.420*** 0.408*** 0.572*** 0.571*** 
 (0.049) (0.046) (0.090) (0.089) 
Price-to-Earnings Ratio 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash Flow -1.011*** -0.982*** -1.309*** -1.344*** 
 (0.177) (0.172) (0.309) (0.304) 
Return on Assets 1.228*** 1.202*** 1.550*** 1.605*** 
 (0.191) (0.187) (0.328) (0.323) 
Cash growth -0.002 -0.003 -0.010** -0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
     
Constant -0.130** -0.128** -0.382*** -0.393*** 
 (0.066) (0.064) (0.141) (0.141) 
     
Year Fixed Effects? No Yes No Yes 
Observations 390 390 390 390 





Table 4 – Effect of Foreign Cash in Cash Holdings Risk – continued 
Panel B: Dependent variable – Cash held at foreign subsidiaries controlled by total Assets 
Table 4 Panel B presents the results from OLS regressions where the dependent variables are the amount of cash 
invested in risky and potentially illiquid securities divided by total assets (columns 1-2), and the amount of cash 
invested in risky and potentially illiquid securities divided by total cash (columns 3-4), and the independent variables 
are cash held at foreign subsidiaries divided by total assets, and control variables. The sample comprises the 100 
largest U.S. companies in 2013 that are not financial or utility companies from 2008-2013 with available information 
in their annual reports (10-K) on the fair value of their financial assets holdings, as well as available data on 
Compustat dataset for for control variables. All control variable construction details are given in Table 2. Some 
regressions include year fixed effects which are not shown. The standard errors (in brackets) are heteroskedasticity 
consistent. Significance levels are indicated as follows: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
 
 Risky Cash/Assets Risky Cash/Cash 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Foreign Cash 0.615*** 0.606*** 1.161*** 1.128*** 
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.162) (0.171) 
Size 0.042* 0.043** 0.045 0.061 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.054) (0.052) 
Leverage -0.165* -0.150 -0.018 -0.017 
 (0.093) (0.092) (0.146) (0.149) 
Market-to-book Ratio 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales Growth 0.099* 0.123** 0.111 0.112 
 (0.054) (0.061) (0.123) (0.141) 
Capex 0.100 0.101 -0.053 -0.013 
 (0.076) (0.075) (0.147) (0.145) 
Price-to-Earnings Rato 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash Flow -1.228** -1.186* -1.746* -1.879* 
 (0.610) (0.602) (0.887) (0.965) 
Return on Assets 1.102* 1.082* 1.373 1.580* 
 (0.579) (0.568) (0.870) (0.930) 
Cash growth 0.002 -0.005 -0.016 -0.031* 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.016) 
     
Constant -0.143 -0.120 -0.030 -0.037 
 (0.113) (0.110) (0.252) (0.241) 
     
Year Fixed Effects? No Yes No Yes 
Observations 125 125 125 125 





Table 4 – Effect of Foreign Cash in Cash Holdings Risk – continued 
Panel C: Dependent variable – Cash held at foreign subsidiaries controlled by total Cash 
Table 4 Panel B presents the results from OLS regressions where the dependent variables are the amount of cash 
invested in risky and potentially illiquid securities divided by total assets (columns 1-2), and the amount of cash 
invested in risky and potentially illiquid securities divided by total cash (columns 3-4), and the independent variables 
are cash held at foreign subsidiaries divided by total cash, and control variables. The sample comprises the 100 
largest U.S. companies in 2013 that are not financial or utility companies from 2008-2013 with available information 
in their annual reports (10-K) on the fair value of their financial assets holdings, as well as available data on 
Compustat dataset for for control variables. All control variable construction details are given in Table 2. Some 
regressions include year fixed effects which are not shown. The standard errors (in brackets) are heteroskedasticity 
consistent. Significance levels are indicated as follows: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
 
 Risky Cash/Assets Risky Cash/Cash 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
% Foreign Cash 0.042 0.034 0.201*** 0.172** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.070) (0.070) 
Size 0.114*** 0.116*** 0.157*** 0.174*** 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.056) (0.055) 
Leverage -0.216* -0.196* -0.158 -0.141 
 (0.111) (0.109) (0.190) (0.190) 
Market-to-book Ratio 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales Growth 0.084 0.104 0.086 0.079 
 (0.067) (0.078) (0.139) (0.165) 
Capex 0.381*** 0.386*** 0.469*** 0.508*** 
 (0.085) (0.085) (0.151) (0.152) 
Price-to-Earnings Ratio 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash Flow -2.514*** -2.442*** -4.265*** -4.282*** 
 (0.634) (0.638) (1.057) (1.107) 
Return on Assets 2.849*** 2.796*** 4.598*** 4.684*** 
 (0.610) (0.604) (0.965) (0.991) 
Cash growth 0.003 -0.008 -0.010 -0.030 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.018) (0.023) 
     
Constant -0.454*** -0.422*** -0.548** -0.539** 
 (0.123) (0.121) (0.267) (0.264) 
     
Year Fixed Effects? No Yes No Yes 
Observations 125 125 125 125 




Table 5– Effect of Foreign Profit in Cash Holdings Risk 
Table 5 presents the results from OLS regressions where the dependent variables are the amount of cash invested in 
risky and potentially illiquid securities divided by total assets (columns 1-2), and the amount of cash invested in risky 
and potentially illiquid securities divided by total cash (columns 3-4), and the independent variables are profit before 
income taxes from their foreign operations divided by total assets and control variables.. The sample comprises the 
100 largest U.S. companies in 2013 that are not financial or utility companies from 2008-2013 with available 
information in their annual reports (10-K) on the fair value of their financial assets holdings, as well as available data 
on Compustat dataset for for control variables. All control variable construction details are given in Table 2. Some 
regressions include year fixed effects which are not shown. The standard errors (in brackets) are heteroskedasticity 
consistent. Significance levels are indicated as follows: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
 
 Risky Cash/Assets Risky Cash/Cash 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Foreign Profit 0.213** 0.215** 0.403* 0.365 
 (0.093) (0.093) (0.229) (0.230) 
Size 0.016 0.019 0.050* 0.059** 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.029) (0.030) 
Leverage -0.002* -0.002** -0.004 -0.005* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Market-to-book Ratio -0.001** -0.001** -0.002* -0.002* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Sales Growth 0.040 0.073** 0.044 0.091 
 (0.025) (0.031) (0.056) (0.067) 
Capex 0.428*** 0.416*** 0.600*** 0.594*** 
 (0.052) (0.049) (0.091) (0.092) 
Price-to-Earnings Ratio 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash Flow -1.280*** -1.256*** -2.219*** -2.244*** 
 (0.193) (0.186) (0.335) (0.328) 
Return on Assets 1.425*** 1.404*** 2.431*** 2.503*** 
 (0.218) (0.214) (0.366) (0.362) 
Cash growth -0.003 -0.004 -0.015*** -0.016*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
Constant -0.074 -0.068 -0.129 -0.140 
 (0.069) (0.067) (0.141) (0.143) 
     
Year Fixed Effects? No Yes No Yes 
Observations 349 349 349 349 
R-squared 0.364 0.378 0.231 0.240 
 
